The NCHER Bill does not allot appropriate levels of autonomy to State governments and universities. Concentration of powers in the commission will undermine academic autonomy and federalism in governance.  

The publication of the draft Central legislation on the constitution of the National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) lays bare the real objectives of the United Progressive Alliance government in dismantling the University Grants Commission (UGC), the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) and setting up a body with overarching powers and responsibilities. (The document is on the website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, at http://www.education.nic.in/). 

It is no longer necessary for academia to engage in endless discussions on the impossibility of reconciling the vision of academic freedom that Professor Yash Pal put forward with the agenda of neo-liberal reforms that Sam Pitroda was so impatient to implement. The Task Force constituted to aid and advise the MHRD to set up the NCHER has side-tracked the issue by paying lip service to the objective of promoting autonomy and recommending a structure that would centralise planning, administration, regulation and financing of higher education, leaving little room for either decentralised academic activity or federal structures of governance in higher education. It is becoming clear that the orchestrated campaign against the discredited deemed universities was but a ploy to divert attention from the agenda of dismantling federal and democratic structures and putting in their place a highly centralised and authoritarian system that is amenable to the emerging global trends in higher education. 

In setting up the NCHER the underlying presumption is that the quality of higher education could improve dramatically if multiple regulatory agencies are replaced by the benevolent dictatorship of an all-powerful and overarching agency endowed with the kind of status that the Election Commission of India enjoys. It is further presumed that a consensus among the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Leader of the Opposition would result in the selection of seven wise men or women who are competent and committed enough to innovate and implement academic policies and programmes relevant for this vast country. The presumption, which is obvious enough, is sought to be covered up by the veil of a national collegium of advisers, a structure that will be neither completely within, nor completely outside, the proposed national commission. 

The structure of the collegium is complicated in that it has two types of members: one set of core members and another set of co-opted members. It is not clear from the draft as to who would nominate the core members, how many of them would be nominated, and whether the nomination of the core members would precede or proceed from the constitution of the commission. As the arrangement stands, the collegium has to suggest a panel from which the members of the commission will have to be selected. Obviously, such an arrangement will bring the collegium into existence, at least in part, before the commission is born. But once the commission comes into existence, the collegium will take on the role of an advisory body, the advice of which will not be binding on the commission. 

The co-opted members have only a subordinate status in the collegium in that they owe their position to the support of the core members and in that their tenure is limited to five years while the core members are nominated for life. The patronage of a position for a lifetime is an innovation for which the MHRD can take credit! The possible rationale is that it would ensure both continuity and change in the determination of policies in higher education.

The deficit of federalism in the new arrangement to regulate higher education is evident from the mode of appointment and the status of the co-opted members who will represent the States and Union Territories in the collegium. The collegium is only an advisory body, external to the commission, the advice of which is not binding on the commission. The right of the core fellows to decide on the area of expertise that particular States could provide in the collegium could be effectively used to eliminate the possibility of federal dissent. The only right the States have is to propose a panel of five experts, of whom one will be chosen by the core fellows. 

An arrangement in which the Central government could nominate experts in various fields and the States representatives of their choice, would have been more in tune with the principles of federalism. This would have ensured the representation of a variety of views and interests in the collegium, while also ensuring due representation of experts. The integration of the collegium into the structure of the commission as its governing body with policy-making responsibilities, and the constitution of a seven-member executive committee from within the governing body and responsible to it (in place of the present seven-member commission) will make more sense, in both academic and federal terms. 

The authority of State legislatures to set up universities will be seriously eroded once the commission comes into existence. In the new situation, universities set up through State Acts can start academic operations only with authorisation from the commission. A better option would have been to make authorisation mandatory for the operation of universities beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the legislating authorities. 

The Bill provides for the preparation of a national registry of people eligible to be selected as Vice-Chancellors and mandates that Vice-Chancellors of State universities be appointed from a panel of names selected by the commission from the registry. The question is not whether the commission would always act fairly, but whether such an arrangement would be consistent with the principles of autonomy of higher educational institutions, which is touted as the basic objective of the commission. The idea of a registry may not be an objectionable one if States have the option to choose any name from the registry and if the right to appoint a person as Vice-Chancellor from outside the list is not entirely ruled out. 

Though the commission is insulated against any intervention by the Central government in its day-to-day administration, the Central government has adequate powers to determine the general policies on higher education and interpret such policy prescriptions. The provision for the exercise of such powers by the Central government has been incorporated to ensure that the government’s right to frame policies and implement them are not delegated to a small agency created by it. 

But the Act does not fully recognise the complementarities in the roles of the Central and State governments, universities and other institutions of higher education. The primary objective of promoting autonomy of higher educational institutions has been overlooked by the appropriation of all powers by the proposed NCHER. The roles of the State governments, universities and other higher educational institutions within their territorial and constitutional jurisdiction have either been trampled upon or ignored. Autonomy implies decentralisation of powers and responsibilities and creation of appropriate norms and structures at different levels to ensure accountability. The Act does not apportion appropriate levels of authority to States, universities and other higher educational institutions, and in the process it violates the principles of federalism and autonomy in the governance of higher educational institutions. 

(Thomas Joseph is Member-Secretary, Kerala State Higher Education Council. E-mail: t.thomas.joseph@gmail.com) 

http://www.thehindu.com/2010/02/06/stories/2010020655550800.htm 

The National Commission on Higher Education and Research Bill aims, in letter and in spirit, to secure the true autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning.  

The Member-Secretary of the Kerala State Higher Education Council, in an article published in these columns on February 6, 2010 on the draft National Commission on Higher Education and Research (NCHER) Bill, argued that the Bill “does not allot appropriate levels of autonomy to States and universities, and in the process violates the principles of federalism and autonomy in the governance of higher educational institutions”. As one associated with the Task Force which prepared the Draft Bill, I felt that the article was written either without a proper understanding of its provisions, or with a motive to prejudice the public mind against true autonomy of higher academic institutions. 

The author also invoked the concept of federalism to attack the Bill, presumably to say that the Union, without competence to legislate on the subject, is attempting to take away the States' authority. Is it his case that the Acts in respect of the University Grants Commission (UGC), the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) which the NCHER is to replace, were also passed by Parliament without constitutional authority? What does he make of Entries 63 to 66 of the Union List and Entry 25 of the Concurrent List in this regard? If the argument is for consultations with States before a law affecting the States and the Union is adopted, that precisely is what the Union government is doing by putting the draft Bill in the public domain and asking the Task Force to visit each State to gather views and comments from the stakeholders. Of course, based on such feedback, the Bill may undergo changes before it is submitted to Parliament for consideration.

Reforming higher education is the common interest of the Union and the States and there is no room for dispute in this regard. The Yash Pal Committee recommended that the key reform needed is restoring the autonomy of universities (not the autonomy of the State governments, which is the function of the Constitution) by avoiding multiple regulators and preventing politicisation of university administration. Autonomy of universities involves autonomy from Central and State governments as well.

The Preamble of the NCHER Bill says it is an “Act to promote the autonomy of higher education institutions for the free pursuit of knowledge and innovation, and for facilitating access, inclusion and opportunities to all… and to provide for an advisory mechanism of eminent peers in academia.” One would expect critics to give reasoned arguments on how the provisions of the Bill contradict these objectives, or in what manner it could be better achieved.

The attempt to unify the multiple regulators and standardise the norms and procedures in a transparent manner is interpreted by the author of that article as centralisation of powers. Yes, the Bill seeks to vest the standard-setting and policy-planning functions in the NCHER. However, the delivery of educational services is a decentralised activity at the institutional level, and the NCHER plays only a facilitatory role in it. It is therefore wrong to say that an “authoritarian system” is being put in place.

Entrusting education in the hands of educationists is what is proposed. In this, they have to function democratically under legislative mandate and on the advice of acknowledged experts in different fields of knowledge. The NCHER cannot be seen as a “benevolent dictator” under the provisions of the draft Bill, as it is to function through various bodies set up with educationists in different branches of knowledge. Its functioning is to be reviewed once every five years and it is to report annually to the President or the Governor on the state of higher education in the country or State as the case may be.

The Collegium of Scholars and learned men is indeed an innovation proposed for advising reform on the structure and content of higher education. They are to be Nobel Laureates, Fellows on learned societies of international repute, Jnanpith Award winners and people of similar distinction. Respecting the federal and democratic principle, the Bill seeks to have nominees of States also in the Collegium. Utilising the expertise and experience of learned men and women settled within and outside the country to promote standards of higher education is the intended objective of the Collegium proposal. If there are suggestions on how the objective can be achieved by changing the composition and constitution of the Collegium, these are to be welcomed. It is an idea with a purpose. It is not intended to give a subordinate status to the nominated members, though the core members are expected to serve the Collegium for a longer period for obvious reasons. All Collegium members serve in an honorary capacity without having to be present physically at one place.

The States and Union Territories have their nominees in the Collegium. The nominees are also expected to be educationists or eminent persons of equivalent status. The core members are not the nominees of the Union government. They are there by virtue of their accomplishments in higher education and research and are invited because of their expertise, experience and status in higher education. If it is desirable to limit the term of the core members also, it can be recommended on the basis of cogent reasons. It is the anxiety to keep the government out in constituting the Collegium that led the Task Force to recommend the method of inviting persons on the basis of their accomplishments in education and research. It is not to be seen as an assault on federalism or democracy. It is the concern for the autonomy of the institution that elections or nominations in the usual course cannot accomplish. Leaving the Union or State governments to “nominate experts of their choice,” as contended in the article, may not serve the objective for which the Collegium is put in place. The Collegium members are not to be government employees; nor can it be assumed that they would agree to become members of the Commission, as suggested in the article.

The State governments' power to set up universities will not be taken away or eroded by the NCHER. As it happens today with the UGC and the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC), the authority to accredit universities, determine standards and finance them will be regulated by the new Commission. Academic clearance is not to be given by the Commission on its own. Accreditation is to be done by an independent accreditation agency recognised under law on the basis of credible evidence gathered according to objective parameters. Towards this end, the NCHER may authorise the academic operations of new universities on the basis of norms and standards set for the purpose. How does the authority of the AICTE or the Medical Council of India (MCI) or the Bar Council of India (BCI) to accredit institutions erode the States' authority to set up universities, as argued in the article?

An innovative measure to secure academic autonomy that is proposed in the Bill relates to the selection of Vice-Chancellors. Many ills of higher education, at present, can be traced to corruption and manipulation involved in the appointment of Vice-Chancellors. The Bill empowers the Collegium to prepare a registry of suitable persons with expertise and experience after a worldwide search and to keep it updated from time to time. It is not necessary that only persons who figure in the registry be appointed. Whenever the Central or State governments want to appoint Vice-Chancellors they can ask, if they so like, for a panel of names from the Commission as per their requirements, and the Commission may provide it. This is to facilitate the search and to present available candidates of distinction within and outside the country. There is no infringement of autonomy in the process; rather, it enhances autonomy by removing potential risks to such autonomy. The States' choice of the person and the right to choose one from outside the registry is in no way compromised by the provisions in the Bill.

Let there be no confusion or misunderstanding that the Bill, in letter and in spirit, aims to secure the true autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. The autonomy proposed will, hopefully, percolate down to each department and each member of the faculty so that teaching and research tend to innovate, experiment and compete for academic excellence and inclusive development. Looked at from this perspective, the NCHER Bill provides a framework and a strategy for securing autonomy of academic institutions and providing an environment for competitive excellence in higher education.

( Professor N.R. Madhava Menon was a Member of the Yash Pal Committee and of the Task Force which drafted the NCHER Bill.)

http://www.thehindu.com/2010/02/22/stories/2010022255871000.htm 

 

This is a response to the rejoinder of Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon (Feb. 22, 2010) to my article on National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) Bill (Feb. 6, 2010). 

I stand by my argument that the pious intensions to promote autonomy of higher educational institutions set forth in the preamble of the bill are undermined by various provisions of the bill. Let me cite a few provisions from the bill. It is mandatory for all universities, including state universities, to appoint Vice-Chancellors only from a panel of five names forwarded by the Commission from within the national registry of scholars prepared by it (clause 26). A university constituted by an act of Parliament or State Legislature shall commence its academic operations only after being authorised by the Commission (clause 32). For such authorisation, the university has to produce satisfactory assessment report from an accreditation agency registered with the Commission (Clause 33). Authorisation once granted can be revoked by the Commission, without reference to the Parliament/State Legislature, as the case may be (clause 36). No university shall award degrees unless it is authorised by the Commission in this regard (Clause 41). The Commission shall frame national curriculum and enforce it in the universities through regulations (Clause 54). All these new arrangements further undermine the limited administrative and academic autonomy the universities enjoy today. 

A single window regulatory system at the Central level might be a convenient device for enforcing national policies across the country. But the bill provides no structural safety-net to insulate the system against authoritarianism and corruption, which have been the bane of apex regulatory bodies like the UGC, the AICTE and the NCTE, which are being subsumed by the NCHER. The apprehension is all the more serious as extensive regulatory, administrative and financial powers, which the UGC or other apex regulatory agencies never enjoyed, are sought to be bestowed upon the Commission. Such concentration of powers in a small body of seven experts is potentially dangerous.

It is not clear as to how the new system could ensure “true autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning.” Autonomy implies not only “delivery of educational services” as “a decentralised activity at the institutional level,” as Dr. Madhava Menon would have us believe, but also taking policy decisions on what to teach, whom to teach and how to teach and setting up and administering institutions that are engaged in such activities. Since autonomy also implies accountability to national and local societal values and goals, the implementation of autonomy inevitably also involves setting up a two-tier regulatory mechanism, one at the national and the other at the State level. Hence the issue of federalism in education is not one of “legislative competence” alone. It is one of the defining features of autonomy, more so in a country of continental dimensions as ours. Autonomy thrives through decentralisation, through celebration of diversity.

In a federal set-up, State governments cannot be treated as a part of the amorphous crowd of “stakeholders.” They are as much policymakers as the Central government. The appropriate forum for consulting the states on the collaborative enterprise of education is not hurriedly convened meetings of “stakeholders,” but the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE), which was revived from limbo after a gap of 10 years only in 2004. Constitutionality apart, a democratic, consensual process of decision making should get precedence over arguments over legislative competence, administrative convenience and pious intentions. Education is so much an integral part of the project of inclusive nation building that it cannot be merrily abandoned to the care of seven experts, even if they all happen to be Nobel Laureates.

 

http://www.thehindu.com/2010/02/24/stories/2010022456521300.htm